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Best-response dynamics in a birth-death model of
evolution in games
Abstract
We consider a model of evolution with mutations as in Kandori et al (1993) [Kandori,M., Mailath, G.J.,
Rob, R., 1993. Learning, mutation, and long run equilibria in games. Econometrica 61, 29-56], where
agents follow best-response decision rules as in Sandholm (1998) [Sandholm, W., 1998. Simple and
clever decision rules for a model of evolution. Economics Letters 61, 165-170]. Contrary to those
papers, our model gives rise to a birth-death process, which allows explicit computation of the long-run
probabilities of equilibria for given values of the mutation rate and the population size. We use this fact
to provide a direct proof of the stochastic stability of riskdominant equilibria as the mutation rate tends
to zero, and illustrate the outcomes of the dynamics for positive mutation rates.
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Many models of learning in games follow the lead of Kandori, Mailath & Rob (1993)
and Young (1993). In this stream of the literature, a basic behavioral rule for agents is
postulated and perturbed with a mutation probability. The focus is then on the limiting
outcome as the mutation probability tends to zero. There are well-established techniques
(see e.g. Ellison (2000) for a review) which allow the identiﬁcation of the long-run outcomes
without explicitly analyzing the stochastic process.
In many such learning models, revision opportunities (learning draws) are independent
across agents, so that all of them might revise simultaneously. An alternative, advocated e.g.
by Blume (1993, 1995, 2003), Bena¨ım & Weibull (2003), and Friedman & Mezzetti (2001),
is posed by models where each period, a single agent is randomly sampled to learn.1
This way, the model becomes a birth-death process. In this note, we make use of the
analytical tractability of such processes to obtain exact results (as opposed to only limit
ones) in a model of learning in games.
∗The authors gratefully acknowledge ﬁnancial support from the Austrian Science Fund (FWF) under
Projects P18141-G09 and P15281.
†Department of Economics, University of Konstanz, Box D-150, D-78457 Konstanz (Germany). E-mail:
Carlos.Alos-Ferrer@uni-konstanz.de
‡Socioeconomic Institute, University of Zurich, Hottingerstrasse 10 CH-8032 Zurich (Switzerland). E-
mail: ilja.neustadt@soi.unizh.ch
1See Alo´s-Ferrer (2003) for a discussion. This formulation is basically equivalent to a more realistic model
where agents receive revision opportunities in continuous time following independent Poisson processes. See
Blume (1995, Section 3).
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We consider a population of N ≥ 2 players who are repeatedly randomly matched to
play a symmetric, 2× 2 game with strategy set {A,B} and payoﬀ matrix
A B
A a, a b, c
B c, b d, d
We assume a > c, b < d, and a+ b < c+ d. This game has two strict, symmetric Nash equi-
libria given by (A,A) and (B,B), such that equilibrium (B,B) is risk-dominant. However,
(A,A) could be payoﬀ-dominant if a > d. There is also a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium
(α∗, α∗) where A is played with probability
α∗ =
d− b
a− c + d− b .
The risk dominance of (B,B) is equivalent to the fact that α∗ > 12 .
The evolution of the population is modelled by a Markov process. The state of population
n ∈ {0, 1, . . . , N − 1, N} is the number of players currently selecting strategy A. Then the
(expected) payoﬀ of a player choosing strategy A or B at state n is given by the expressions
π(A,n) =
n− 1
N − 1 a +
N − n
N − 1 b,
π(B,n) =
n
N − 1 c +
N − n− 1
N − 1 d
which take into account the fact that a player does not play against himself.2
We follow Sandholm (1998) and Alo´s-Ferrer (2003) and assume that players are myopic
best-responders.3 This decision rule can be summarized as follows:
When playing strategy A, switch to strategy B if π(A,n) < π(B,n− 1).
When playing strategy B, switch to strategy A if π(B,n) < π(A,n + 1).
It remains to specify players’ behavior in the (nongeneric) case of payoﬀ ties. We pos-
tulate a ﬁxed probability η ∈ [0, 1] of switching from the current strategy if a tie occurs,
reﬂecting e. g. unmodelled switching costs.4
Elementary computations show that an A-player switches to B if
π(A,n) < π(B,n− 1) ⇐⇒ (n− 1)(a− c) < (N − n)(d− b)
⇐⇒ n < (N − 1)α∗ + 1 = : nA
A B-player switches to A if
π(B,n) < π(A,n + 1) ⇐⇒ n(a− c) > (N − n− 1)(d− b)
⇐⇒ n > (N − 1)α∗ =: nB
2If the number of players is odd, there is a probability 1
N
that a given player is not matched. The
expected payoﬀs then are π′(s, n) = N−1
N
π(s, n) + 1
N
k, where k is the default payoﬀ of not being matched.
The analysis remains unchanged with this speciﬁcation. An alternative interpretation yielding payoﬀs as in
the expression above is that they are matched once against every other agent in a round-robin tournament.
3This decision rule is not the one implicitly used by Kandori et al. (1993). See Sandholm (1998) for
details.
4As we will see, this is of no consequence for the analysis. Sandholm (1998) assumes that η = 0, which
corresponds to a “switch only if strictly better” rule.
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Clearly, nA − nB = 1. The thresholds nA, nB are closely linked to the mixed-strategy
equilibrium strategy α∗. Notice that nBN ≤ α∗ ≤ nAN .
We distinguish 2 cases. In the generic case, nA, nB /∈ N. In the non-generic case,
nA, nB ∈ N. We will only consider the generic case in detail and merely report the results
for the nongeneric case.
In the generic case, let n∗ be the only integer in ]nB , nA[. That is, n∗ = nA = 	nB
.
Notice that, since α∗N ∈]nB , nA[, n∗ can be taken to be an integer approximation to the
mixed-strategy equilibrium. Note that n∗ > nB = (N − 1)α∗ > 12N whenever α∗ > 12 NN−1 .
Since α∗ > 12 by risk dominance of (B,B), it follows that, given a ﬁxed game, this latter
condition is fulﬁlled for N large enough. Given a ﬁxed population size, it is fulﬁlled when
(B,B) is signiﬁcantly risk-dominant, i. e. α∗ is not too close to 12 .
In the generic case, payoﬀ ties are not possible. A-players switch to B if and only if
n ≤ n∗, while B-players switch to A if and only if n ≥ n∗.
Consider now the following dynamics. Each period, exactly one player is sampled at
random (uniformly) from the population and receives the opportunity to revise his strategy.
If the current state is n, the probability for an A-player to be selected is n/N , while the
corresponding probability for a B-player is (N − n)/N .
With probability 1 − ε, the selected player takes the action prescribed by myopic best
reply. With probability 0 < ε < 12 , he mutates and takes the opposite action.
Let Pij be the probability of transition from a state i to another state j. Clearly, Pij = 0
whenever |i− j| > 1, i. e. we have a birth-death process. Further,
Pn,n−1 =
{
(1− ε) nN if 1 ≤ n ≤ n∗
ε nN if n
∗ + 1 ≤ n ≤ N
Pn,n+1 =
{
ε N−nN if 0 ≤ n ≤ n∗ − 1
(1− ε) N−nN if n∗ ≤ n ≤ N − 1
and Pnn = 1− Pn,n−1 − Pn,n+1 for all n = 0, . . . , N .
The invariant distribution ρ has full support and fulﬁlls the detailed balance condition,5
ρ(n)Pn,n+1 = ρ(n + 1)Pn+1,n.
Deﬁne, for convenience, β = ε1−ε . Then,
ρ(n + 1)
ρ(n)
=
{
β N−nn+1 if 0 ≤ n ≤ n∗ − 1
1
β
N−n
n+1 if n
∗ ≤ n ≤ N − 1
Iterating, we obtain, for any 1 ≤ n ≤ n∗,
ρ(n) = ρ(0)βn
n−1∏
j=0
(
N − j
j + 1
)
(1)
and for any n∗ + 1 ≤ n ≤ N
ρ(n) = ρ(n∗)
1
βn−n∗
n−1∏
j=n∗
(
N − j
j + 1
)
= β2n
∗−nρ(0)
n−1∏
j=0
(
N − j
j + 1
)
. (2)
These computations allow us to obtain the following result.
5Discrete-time birth-death processes are deﬁned as Markov chains such that (i) the state space is either
the nonnegative integers or a ﬁnite set {0, . . . , N}, and (ii) for every state n, the only positive-probability
transitions are to states n, n − 1, and n + 1, with the last two being strictly positive. The detailed balance
condition follows directly from the deﬁnition of invariant distribution applied to this particular case. See
e. g. Feller (1968, p.396).
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Theorem 1. Consider the generic case. Let 0 < ε < 1 and N ≥ 2 such that α∗ > 12 NN−1 .
Then,
(a) The invariant distribution fulﬁlls
ρ(0) =
[
1 +
n∗∑
n=1
βn
(
N
n
)
+
N∑
n=n∗+1
β2n
∗−n
(
N
n
)]−1
(3)
where
(
N
n
)
=
∏n−1
j=0
(
N−j
j+1
)
are the binomial coeﬃcients.
(b) ρ(N)/ρ(0) = β2n
∗−N ∼= β(2α∗−1)N .
(c) For ﬁxed N , limε→0 ρ(0) = 1.
(d) For ﬁxed ε, limN→∞ ρ(0) = limN→∞ ρ(N) = 0.
Proof. (a) follows from (1) and (2) observing that
∑N
n=0 ρ(n) = 1. (b) is a direct consequence
of (2). (c) follows from (a) noting that the condition α∗ > 12
N
N−1 implies n
∗ > 12N .
To show (d), notice that the expression in brackets in (3) is bounded below by 1 + βN ,
which diverges to +∞ (for ﬁxed ε > 0) as N → +∞. Thus ρ(0) converges to 0. Since
n∗ > 12N , β
2n∗−N is bounded above by 1 (recall that 0 < ε < 12 , thus 0 < β < 1) and (b)
implies that ρ(N) also converges to 0. 
A state s is stochastically stable (Kandori et al. (1993)) if limε→0 ρ(s) > 0. By the ergodic
theorem, stochastically stable states are the only ones which are observed a signiﬁcant
fraction of time in the long run. Thus, part (c) states that the only stochastically stable
state is full coordination on the risk-dominant equilibrium. although this result can also be
proven with the familiar “mutation-counting” techniques, the direct proof presented here has
the advantage of providing the closed-form formula (a) for ρ(0) when ε is strictly positive.
Clearly, the best-reply process will spend most of its time at the states 0 and N , where
full coordination on the pure-strategy Nash equilibria is achieved. Thus, for ε small but
positive, the odds ratio ρ(N)/ρ(0) gives an approximation for the proportion of time that
the system spends on each equilibrium, for ε > 0 and ﬁnite N . Since risk dominance amounts
to α∗ > 12N , part (b) constitutes an extremely simple summary of the results.
Finally, part (d) observes that, for ﬁxed mutation rates but increasing population, the
long-run distribution concentrates its weight in the interior of the state space. This result is
natural due to the birth-death nature of the process. Take for instance a state with low n,
where the best-reply dynamics points towards n−1. As the population grows but ε remains
ﬁxed, the probability nN of sampling an A-player, who would then switch to B, becomes
smaller than the probability of sampling a B player who then mutates to A, εN−nN . Hence,
the mutation-plus-best-reply dynamics points away from the corners. In a sense, this is the
birth-death version of the well-known critique that, in models of learning with mutation,
results become less plausible as the population size becomes large.6
We proceed now to brieﬂy report on the (analogous) results for the non-generic case. In
this case, nA, nB ∈ N and payoﬀ ties occur at states nA and nB . Recall that η ∈ [0, 1] is the
probability of switching from the current strategy if a tie occurs.
Thus, A-players switch to B if n < nA, do not change if n > nA, and randomize if
n = nA. B-players switch to A if n > nB = nA−1, do not change if n < nB , and randomize
if n = nB .
6In Kandori et al. (1993), this leads to the observation that the expected time of convergence to the
stochastically stable state is extremely long for large population sizes.
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This induces the transition probabilities
Pn,n−1 =
⎧⎨
⎩
(1− ε) nN if 1 ≤ n ≤ nB
[(1− ε)η + (1− η)ε] nN if n = nA
ε nN if nA + 1 ≤ n ≤ N
Pn,n+1 =
⎧⎨
⎩
ε N−nN if 0 ≤ n ≤ nB − 1
[(1− ε)η + (1− η)ε] N−nN if n = nB
(1− ε) N−nN if nA ≤ n ≤ N − 1
Letting again β = (1− ε)/ε, iteration of the detailed balance condition yields
ρ(n) = βnρ(0)
(
N
n
)
for 1 ≤ n ≤ nB
ρ(nA) = N−nBnA ρ(nB) = β
nBρ(0)
(
N
nA
)
ρ(n) = β2nA−n−1ρ(0)
(
N
n
)
for nA + 1 ≤ n ≤ N
Hence, ties play no role whatsoever. This yields the following analogous equation to (3)
ρ(0) =
[
1 +
nA−1∑
n=1
βn
(
N
n
)
+ βnA−1
(
N
nA
)
+
N∑
n=nA+1
β2nA−n−1
(
N
n
)]−1
(4)
To conclude, we make use of (3) and (4) to illustrate the outcomes of the dynamics for
positive mutation rates and ﬁnite population size. Consider a coordination game as above
with a = 1, b = c = 0, and d > 1. Figure 1(a) represents ρ(0) for d = 2 and N = 50 as ε
varies. Stochastic stability implies that the full probability piles up on 0 as ε → 0, but we
can observe that ρ(0) has a signiﬁcant probability for small but strictly positive values of ε.
Figure 1(b) represents the invariant distribution for the same parameter values, ﬁxing
ε = 0.01. The shape is, of course, as expected, with probability piling up (60%) on state 0.
This illustrates also that, for ﬁxed values of ε and N , full coordination is achieved only part
of the time (60% in the particular case represented). The representation is truncated at the
state n = 10; for n ≥ 11, we have that ρ(n) < 3× 10−12.
We then perform a ﬁrst sensitivity illustration in ﬁgure 1(c). This ﬁgure represents ρ(0)
for ε = 0.01 and N = 50 as d varies between 1 and 4. The weight ρ(0) is almost constant
(resulting in a practically ﬂat representation), as long as (B,B) is risk-dominant. As d
approaches 1, though, (B,B) becomes “less risk-dominant” and the condition α∗ > 12
N
N−1
is violated,7 making both 0 and N stochastically stable and ρ(0) = ρ(1) = 0.3.
Figure 1(d) represents ρ(0) for d = 2 and ε = 0.01 as N varies. As predicted by Theorem
1(d), for a ﬁxed mutation rate, coordination becomes less probable as population grows.
Figure 1(e) clariﬁes this point. This ﬁgure shows the invariant distribution for d = 2,
ε = 0.01, and N = 1001, with the range truncated at N = 50 (ρ(n) < 2 × 10−20 for all
n ≥ 51). With this large population size,8 the dynamics points away from the corners.
Risk dominance, though, leads to the distribution being skewed towards 0. Most of the
probability piles up very close to but away from state 0 (recall that the ﬁgure shows only
the range 0 − 50, whereas the population size is 1001). Figure 1(f) further illustrates this,
showing the full invariant distribution for d = 2, ε = 0.1, and the original population size
N = 50. For such a high mutation rate, a population size of 50 is already “large” and again
the dynamics points away from the corners.
7Equations (3) and (4) still hold, though. Examination of (3) reveals the reason for the ﬂatness of the
representation. As d changes, (3) changes only in terms βn for n ≥ n∗. But, for d > 1, we have that n∗ ≥ 25.
8We choose 1001 because 1000 lies in the non-generic case.
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(a) ρ(0) given ε, for d = 2, N = 50. (b) Distribution ρ for d = 2, ε = 0.01, N = 50.
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(c) ρ(0) given d, for ε = 0.01, N = 50.
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(d) ρ(0) given N , for d = 2, ε = 0.01.
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(e) Distribution ρ for d = 2, ε = 0.01, N = 1001. (f) Distribution ρ for d = 2, ε = 0.1, N = 50.
Figure 1: These ﬁgures show variations with respect to a default situation with population
size N = 50, mutation rate ε = 0.01, and a risk-dominant equilibrium with payoﬀ d = 2
(a = 1, b = c = 0). (a) represents the weight ρ(0) of the risk-dominant equilibrium as
ε varies. (b) shows the (truncated) invariant distribution for the given parameters. (c)
represents ρ(0) as d varies. (d) represents ρ(0) as N increases. (e) shows the (truncated)
invariant distribution for N = 1001. (f) shows the full invariant distribution for ε = 0.1.
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